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abstract
This paper estimates Bejarano and Charry (2014)’s small open economy
with financial frictions model for the Colombian economy using Bayesian
estimation techniques. Additionally, I compute the welfare gains of
implementing an optimal response to credit spreads into an augmented
Taylor rule. The main result is that a reaction to credit spreads does not
imply significant welfare gains unless the economic disturbances increases
its volatility, like the disruption implied by a financial crisis. Otherwise its
impact over the macroeconomic variables is null.
1 introduction
The 2008 financial crisis renewed economists’ interest over the debate about
the role of central banks on the achievement financial stability. In this de-
bate, whether monetary authority should target a financial measure besides
inflation and output to prevent a negative impact over the economy has
gained importance.
Motivated by Taylor (2008) and Mishkin (2008), which proposed that the
Federal Reserve should lower the interest rate to increases of credit spreads
as a way to mitigate the adverse effect of the financial crisis over the real
economy, Curdia and Woodford (2010) analyzed the effects of including the
spread between deposits and loans interest rate into a Taylor Rule in a DSGE
framework calibrated to reflect US economy dynamics . They found that
this reaction is recommended for financial and non-financial disturbances,
but the optimal size of the response would depend on the source and the
persistence of the disturbance. Additionally, empirical studies such as Belke
and Klose (2010), Castro (2011), Martin and Milas (2013), and Huang (2015)
have concluded that the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank or the
Bank of England have responded to credit spreads during or before the 2008
financial crisis.
These studies were focused mainly on developed economies. However,
analysis of the relation between monetary policy and credit spreads are
scarce in countries like Colombia. Since Colombian monetary policy is
conducted similarly to US, it is possible to apply Curdia and Woodford
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(2010) analysis to the Colombian framework. However, US and Colombian
economies differ in several aspects; mainly that Colombia is a small open
economy.
In this sense, Bejarano and Charry (2014) extended Curdia and Woodford
(2010) model to a small open economy framework. Their conclusions differ
substantially from Curdia and Woodford (2010) model since they found that
including spreads on the Taylor rule is just recommended if the source of
the disturbance is the foreign interest rate. An important remark about
Bejarano and Charry (2014) model is that most of the parameters used were
the same as Curdia and Woodford (2010) analysis in order to focus mainly
on the effect of opening the economy.
In order to apply this analysis to the Colombian economy, this paper es-
timates Bejarano and Charry (2014) model’s structural parameters through
Bayesian estimation techniques using Colombian data on main macroeco-
nomic variables, as on interest rates. The main reason to estimate the struc-
tural parameters using Colombian data is for the model to reflect Colombian
aggregate variables dynamics. Both, Curdia and Woodford (2010) and Be-
jarano and Charry (2014) conclusions are based on a calibration that reflects
US macroeconomics variable dynamics, but these conclusions might differ
in the context of the Colombian economy.
Once the parameters are estimated, this paper computes the optimal re-
sponse to credit spreads in a Taylor rule by maximizing an aggregate welfare
function approximated up to second order. Then, to asses the gains of im-
plementing the optimal response described above, we compute the welfare
loss as the percentage of consumption sacrificed from not reacting at all to
credit spreads instead of implementing the optimal reaction. Finally, we
perform counterfactual analysis comparing historic data to simulated data
where monetary authority implements the optimal response. This is done
to to determine the impact on macroeconomic variables, such as output or
debt, of implementing the optimal reaction.
The main result of this research is that implementing an optimal reac-
tion to credit spreads do not imply significant welfare gains because credit
spreads volatility is low compared to other macroeconomic variables. The
Credit spread is rather a stable measure that does not have great impact
over the economy. If the the central bank implemented an optimal response
to credit spread, aggregate macroeconomic variables would display almost
exactly the same dynamics as if it did not respond at all. However, similar
to the 2008 financial crisis, during financial turmoil credit spreads volatil-
ity increases significantly and impacts adversely debt and output. In this
scenario, it is highly recommended to react to credit spreads as it would
stabilize output faster and prevent it from falling that much compared to
not reacting at all.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the struc-
ture of the model, emphasizing in the introduction of the credit spread and
the main characteristics of the small open economy. In Section 3 estimates
the model’s structural parameters through Bayesian estimation techniques.
Section 4 computes the optimal response to credit spreads and the welfare
gains implied, explaining under which circumstances such a reaction is rec-
ommended. Finally, in Section 5 the main conclusions are summarize.
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2 a small open economy with financial frictions
This is a basic New Keynesian model with the following additional as-
sumptions: i) the existence of two different types of households: savers
and borrowers, ii) the economy can only channel funds from savers to bor-
rowers through a financial intermediary, iii) the financial intermediary can
be funded by foreign liabilities, besides savers funds, and iv) households
can consume three different baskets: domestic traded goods, domestic non-
traded goods, and imported goods. The first two assumptions account for
the introduction of a financial friction that creates a wedge between the de-
posit and the credit interest rate. The last two account for setting the small
open economy framework.
2.1 Financial Friction: the Credit Spread
2.1.1 Heterogeneous Households: Intertemporal Optimization Problem
Heterogeneity is introduced by assuming that households differ in their
preferences. Hence, at period t they can be either a saver or a borrower
household according to the following discounted intertemporal objective
function:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt
[
uτt(i)(ct(i); εt)−
∫ 1
0
vτt(i)(ht(j; i); εt)dj
]
(1)
where τt(i) ∈ {b, s} indicates the household’s type in period t. Period util-
ity uτt(i)(ct(i); εt) is function of a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of differentiated
consumption goods ct(i). Disutility of work vτt(i)(ht(j; i); εt) is function of a
continuum of different types of specialized labor, indexed by j, that house-
holds supply to domestic non-traded good firms. Finally, both uτt(i) and
vτt(i) can be shifted by a vector of aggregate taste shocks εt.
For this analysis we assume that utility of consumption and disutility of
work are of the form:
uτt(i)(ct(i); εt) =
ct(i)1−
1
στ C¯τ
1
στ
1− 1στ
(2)
and
vτt(i)(ht(j; i); εt) =
ψτ
1+ ν
ht(i, j)1+νH¯t
−ν (3)
where στ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of type τ; C¯τt is an
aggregate preference shock to consumption of type τ; ψτ is a scalar factor
for type τ, ν is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and H¯t is an
aggregate preference shock to labor.
Households may change type according to an independent two-state Markov
chain. Each period, with probability 1− δ each household may drawn a new
type; otherwise it remains the same. After a new type is drawn, it becomes a
borrower with probability pib and a saver with probability pis. It is assumed
risk-sharing households that can sign state contingent contracts with one an-
other to insure against aggregate and idiosyncratic risk from the household
random drawn of its type.1 This insurance is intermittent, and households
1 This facilitates aggregation by avoiding that financial wealth depend on household idiosyn-
cratic risk.
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are only able to sign these contracts whenever they face a new type drawn.
In this case, household will receive a net transfer Tt(i) and learns its type.
Then, it makes its spending, saving and borrowing decisions, taking into
account its new type.
Household’s beginning-of-period nominal net financial wealth is given
by:
At(i) = [Bt−1(i)]+(1+ idt−1) + [Bt−1(i)]
−(1+ ibt−1) + D
int
t + Tt(i) (4)
where Bt−1 is the household net financial wealth for period t − 1; [B]+ ≡
max(B, 0) is the financial wealth household i has on deposits to the finan-
cial intermediaries or government debt; [B]− ≡ min(B, 0) if the financial
wealth from credit owed to the financial intermediaries; idt is the riskless
one-period deposits interest rate, ibt is the borrowing interest rate; and D
int
t
is the distributed profits from the financial intermediary.
Households end-of-period nominal net financial wealth is given by:
Bt(i) = At(i)− Ptct(i) +
∫ j
0
Wt(j)ht(i, j)dj + Dn,t + Dx,t + Dm,t + T
g
t (5)
where Pt is the Dixit-Stiglitz price index for period t; Wt(j) is the wage of
labor type j; Dn,t are the profits from the non-traded good producing firms;
Dx,t are the profits from the traded good producing firms; Dm,t are the
profits from the imported good producing firms; and Tgt is the lump-sum
transfer received from the government.
If it is assumed that ψs and ψb are calibrated so that both types choose to
work the same hours in steady state, the existence of heterogeneous house-
holds is guaranteed, at least around the equilibrium, if ubc(c; ε) > usc(c; ε) (so
borrowers have a higher impatience to consume) and ibt > i
d
t . The fist condi-
tion is assured by calibrating σb > σs, the second will be shown in the next
section. These two conditions imply that the set of borrowers B will always
choose Bt(i) < 0, the set of savers S will choose Bt(i) > 0, and i = [B, S].2
By maximizing (1) with respect to ct(i), ht(i, j), and Bt(i)/Pt subject to
(4) and (5) and, then, aggregating over B and S we have the following fist
order conditions:
λτt =
(
C¯τt
cτt
) 1
στ
(6)
µwt ψτ
(
ht(j)τ
H¯t
)ν
= λτt
Wt(j)
Pt
(7)
λst = βEt
{
(1+ idt )
Πt+1
[δλst + (1− δ)Λt]
}
(8)
λbt = βEt
{
(1+ ibt )
Πt+1
[
δλbt + (1− δ)Λt
]}
(9)
Λt = pibλ
s
t + pisλ
b
t (10)
where λτt is the marginal utility of consumption for type τ, Λt is the marginal
utility aggregated over i , µwt is a wage mark-up shock which is assumed
exogenous, and Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is period t inflation.
2 For more details see section 1.1 from Curdia and Woodford (2009) on-line appendix.
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2.1.2 Financial Intermediaries
As it was stated above, when households cannot sign state-contingent con-
tracts, we assume that funds from savers to borrowers can only be channeled
through a financial intermediary. Additionally, we assume that the financial
intermediary can also channel funds to borrowers from international finan-
cial markets. 3 Then, expected real profits from the financial intermediary
sector can be expressed as 4
Et
Dintt+1
Pt+1
= Et
{
bt(1+ ibt )
Πt+1
− dt(1+ i
d
t )
Πt+1
− qt+1b∗t (1+ id∗t )(1+ ϕt)
}
(11)
where bt are the aggregate loans, dt are the aggregate deposits, qt is the
real exchange rate, b∗t are international financial markets funds, id∗t is the
foreign interest rate, which is assumed to be exogenous, and ϕt is the risk
premium with the form suggested by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003) where
it increases to deviations of international financial markets funds to GDP
ratio from its steady state value:
ϕt = ψ1
(
exp(
qtbt
gdpt
− qssbss
gdpss
)− 1
)
(12)
The financial intermediary can only channel these funds assuming a cost
Ξ(bt) and faces an aggregate default probability χt on every loan, which
is assumed exogenous. We assume that the costs associated to channeling
funds come from consuming non-traded goods. In order to repay savers
and international financial markets we have the following real resource con-
straint for financial intermediaries:
bt + P˜n,tΞ(bt) + χtbt = dt + qtb∗t (13)
where P˜n,t = Pn,t/Pt is the non-traded good price relative to the Dixit-Stiglitz
price index. We assume that Ξ(bt) = Ξ˜tb
η
t , with η > 1 in order to have non-
decreasing and convex cost over aggregate loans, and we assume Ξ˜t to be an
exogenous shock. By maximizing (11) with respect to bt, dt, and b∗t subject
to (13) we have that:
(1+ ibt ) = (1+ i
d
t )(1+ωt) (14)
(1+ idt ) = Et
{
qt+1(1+ id∗t )(1+ ϕt)Πt+1
qt
}
(15)
where ωt is the credit spread from deposits and loans interest rate of the
form:
ωt = P˜n,tΞ˜tηb
η−1
t + χt (16)
As it was discussed above, one condition to guarantee the existence of
heterogeneous households was that ibt > i
d
t , which we make sure since from
the definition ωt > 0.
3 We calibrate the model in order that financial intermediaries always choose to borrow from
international markets instead of lending them; hence b∗t > 0.
4 Most international funds for the Colombian economy come through Foreign Direct Investment.
However, since is a model without investment, we just choose this structure to reflect the fact
that these international funds finance domestic debt.
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2.2 The Small Open Economy
2.2.1 Intratemporal Optimization Problem
Another important characteristic of a Small Open Economy is for the possi-
bility to import a foreign traded-good and to export a domestic traded good.
In this sense, it is assumed that the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of differentiated
consumption goods ct(i) is of the form:
ct(i) =
[
γ
1
ρh ch,t(i)
ρh−1
ρh + (1− γ)
1
ρh c f ,t(i)
ρh−1
ρh
] ρh
ρh−1
(17)
where γ is the parameter controlling the participation of households ex-
penditure in domestic goods, ρh is the elasticity of substitution between
imported and domestic goods consumption, ch,t(i) is household i consump-
tion of the domestic good, and c f ,t(i) is households i consumption of the
imported good.
Additionally, the consumption of the domestic good can be differentiated
between the consumption of a non-traded good and a traded good by
ch,t(i) =
[
γ
1
ρn
n cn,t(i)
ρn−1
ρn + (1− γn)
1
ρn cx,t(i)
ρn−1
ρn
] ρn
ρn−1
(18)
where, similarly as above, γn controls the participation of household con-
sumption in the domestic non-traded good, ρn is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the domestic non-traded good and the domestic traded good,
cn,t(i) is household i consumption of the domestic non-traded good, and
cx,t(i) is households i consumption of the domestic traded good.
We assume that the domestic non-traded good and the imported good
are baskets of differentiated goods indexed by j and m, respectively. Then it
follows that:
cn,t(i) =
[∫ 1
0
cn,t(j)
θn−1
θn dj
] θn
θn−1
(19)
c f ,t(i) =
[∫ 1
0
c f ,t(m)
θ f −1
θ f dm
] θ f
θ f −1
(20)
Since household heterogeneity has no impact over the optimal composi-
tion of consumption baskets, we can aggregate over i and solve households
intra-temporal consumption decision problems. This will provide us with
the following equilibrium conditions:
• For the optimal allocation between domestic and imported goods
ch,t = γct P˜h,t
−ρh (21)
c f ,t = (1− γ)ct P˜f ,t−ρh (22)
Pt =
[
γP1−ρhh,t + (1− γ)P
1−ρh
f ,t
] 1
1−ρh (23)
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• For the optimal allocation between domestic non-traded and traded
goods
cn,t = γnch,tPn,t
−ρn (24)
cx,t = (1− γn)ch,tPx,t−ρn (25)
Ph,t =
[
γnP
1−ρn
n,t + (1− γn)P1−ρnx,t
] 1
1−ρn (26)
Where Pn,t = Pn,t/Ph,t and Px,t = Px,t/Ph,t.
• For the optimal allocation between differentiated domestic non-traded
goods
cn,t(j) =
(
Pn,t(j)
Pn,t
)−θn
cn,t (27)
Pn,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pn,t(j)θn−1dj
] 1
θn−1
(28)
• For the optimal allocation between differentiated imported goods
c f ,t(m) =
(
Pf ,t(m)
Pf ,t
)−θ f
c f ,t (29)
Pf ,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pf ,t(m)
θ f−1dm
] 1
θ f −1
(30)
2.2.2 Firms’ Pricing Decision
Domestic Non-Traded Good
We assume that households supply labor to each j non traded good produc-
ing firms. From equation (7) we can solve for hτt and aggregate over i to
obtain labor supply to firm j
ht(j) = H¯t
[
Wt(j)
Pt
λ˜t
µwt ψ
] 1
ν
(31)
where (
λ˜t
ψ
) 1
ν
= pib
(
λbt
ψb
) 1
ν
+ pis
(
λst
ψs
) 1
ν
(32)
Additionally, we assume that non-traded good producing firms have a
production technology of the form:
yn,t(j) = zt (ht(j))
1
φ (33)
where zt is a productivity shock common to all non-traded good producing
firms, and φ is assumed to be grater than 1. We define labor real expenditure
of firm j as:
linct(j) =
Wt(j)
Pt
ht(j) (34)
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Given that yn,t(j) = cn,t(j), and replacing equation (27), we can determine
linct(j) by solving for ht(j) in equation (33) and Wt(j)/Pt in equation (31).
Then, we have that:
linct(j) =
(
µwt ψ
λ˜tH¯νt
)(
yn,t
zt
)1+ωy (Pn,t(j)
Pn,t
)−θn(1+ωy)
(35)
where ωy = φ(1+ ν). We can define firm j nominal profits as
Dn,t(j) = [Pn,t(j)yn,t(j)(1− τn,t)− Ptlinct(j)] (36)
where τn,t is the tax payed for each sold non-traded good. Firm j can only
update its price Pn,t(j) with probability α each period. Then, replacing equa-
tions (27), (33), and (35), firm j maximizing problem becomes:
Pn,t(j)∗ =argmax
[
Et
∞
∑
T=t
αT−tQt,T
{
Pn,t(j)
(
Pn,t(j)
Pn,T
)−θn
yn,T(1− τn,T)−
PT
(
µwTψ
λ˜T H¯νT
)(
yn,T
zT
)1+ωy (Pn,t(j)
Pn,T
)−θn(1+ωy)}]
(37)
Where Qt,T is the stochastic discount factor given by
Qt,T = βT−t
ΛT Pt
ΛtPT
(38)
From the maximization problem stated above we get the following fist
order condition: (
Pn,t(j)∗
Pn,t
)θnωy+1
=
Kn,t
Fn,t
(39)
Where
Kn,t = Λtµn(1+ωy)
(
µwt ψ
λ˜t H¯νt
)(
yn,t
zt
)1+ωy
+ αβEt[Kn,t+1Π
θn(1+ωy)
n,t+1 ] (40)
Fn,t = Λt P˜n,tyn,t(1− τn,t) + αβEt[Fn,t+1Πθn−1n,t+1] (41)
Here Kn,t is the discounted marginal cost, µn = θn/(θn − 1) is the firm’s
mark up, Πn,t is the non-traded good inflation, and Fn,t is the discounted
marginal revenue. Because only a share α of all non-traded good producing
firms can update their prices, we replace equation (39) in (28), aggregate
over j , and, after some algebra, get
Πn,t =
1− (1− α)
(
Kn,t
Fn,t
) 1−θn
1+θnωy
α

1
θn−1
(42)
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Imported Good
We assume that an importing firm can differentiate an imported good at no
cost and then sell it to the households. Then, firm m nominal profits are
given by
D f ,t(m) =
[
Pf ,t(m)y f ,t(m)(1− τf ,t)− StP∗f ,ty f ,t(m)
]
(43)
where St is the nominal exchange rate, τf ,t is a tax for each imported good
sold, and P∗f ,t is the imported good international price, which is assumed
exogenous. Similarly to the non-traded good producing firms, they can only
update its price with probability α each period. Since c f ,t(m) = y f ,t(m),
replacing equation (29) into equation (43), firm m maximizing problem
becomes:
Pf ,t(m)∗ =argmax
Et ∞∑
T=t
αT−tQt,T
Pf ,t(m)
(
Pf ,t(m)
Pf ,T
)−θ f
y f ,T(1− τf ,T)−
StP∗f ,t
(
Pf ,t(m)
Pf ,t
)−θ f
c f ,t


(44)
From this maximization problem we get the following fist order condition:(
Pf ,t(m)∗
Pf ,t
)
=
K f ,t
Ff ,t
(45)
Where
K f ,t = Λtµ f qtP∗f ,ty f ,t + αβEt[K f ,t+1Π
θ f
f ,t+1] (46)
Ff ,t = Λt P˜f ,ty f ,t(1− τf ,t) + αβEt[Ff ,t+1Πθ f−1f ,t+1] (47)
Here K f ,t is the discounted marginal cost, µ f = θ f /(θ f − 1) is the firm’s
mark up, Π f ,t is the imported good inflation, and Ff ,t is the discounted
marginal revenue. Similarly to the non-traded good case, by replacing equa-
tion (45) into (30), and aggregating over m we get
Π f ,t =
1− (1− α)
(K f ,t
Ff ,t
)1−θ f
α

1
θ f −1
(48)
Domestic Traded Good
Finally, we assume that the domestic traded good price is set abroad. Hence,
the price that households pay for the domestic traded good can be described
by
P˜x,t = qtP∗x,t (49)
where P˜x,t = Px,t/Pt and P∗x,t is the domestic traded price payed at interna-
tional markets, which is assumed exogenous. At the same time, we assume
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that the domestic economy is endowed with yx,t units of the domestic traded
good, then domestic traded good firm profits is described by:
Dx,t = P˜x,tyx,t(1− τx,t) (50)
where τx,t is a tax charged by the government for every unit of domestic
traded good produced.
2.2.3 Aggregate Supply
Given that the domestic non traded good is used by households, govern-
ment expenditure and the financial intermediary in order to channel funds
to borrowers, aggregate domestic non-traded good can be expressed as
yn,t = cn,t + gt + Ξtb
η
t (51)
At the same time, the domestic traded good is exported, so the the firms
produce this to satisfy domestic and foreign demand given by
yx,t = cx,t + c∗x,t (52)
where c∗x,t corresponds to exports of the domestic traded good, which is
assumed exogenous. Finally, firms import the foreign good just in order to
satisfy domestic demand. This implies
y f ,t = c f ,t (53)
Using equations (51), (52), and (53) we can characterize Gross Domestic
Product as
gdpt = P˜n,tyn,t + P˜x,tyx,t + P˜f ,ty f ,t − qtP∗f ,ty f ,t (54)
2.3 Public Sector
Fiscal Policy
The government is assumed to purchase quantity gt of the domestic non-
traded good. This purchase is financed by taxes to each unit sold of the
domestic traded good τx,t, the domestic non-traded good τn,t, the imported
good τf ,t, and additionally, lump-sum taxes to households T
g
t and borrow-
ing from households at (1+ idt ). Hence, government’s real budget constraint
is given by
P˜n,tgt = P˜x,tyx,tτx,t + P˜n,tyn,tτn,t + P˜f ,ty f ,tτf ,t + b
g
t +
Tgt
Pt
− bgt−1
(1+ idt )
Πt
(55)
We assume that τx,t, τn,t, τf ,t, gt, and b
g
t are exogenous shocks.
Monetary Policy
Following Curdia and Woodford (2010) we assume that monetary policy is
represented by an augmented Taylor Rule that account for deviations of the
credit spread from its steady state value besides deviations of inflation from
its target value and gdpt from its natural value. This means that the deposits
interest rate is represented as
idt = i
n,d
t + φpipit + φy(gdpt − gdpnt )− φω(ωt −ωss) (56)
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Here in,dt and gdp
n
t represents the natural deposit interest rate and gross
domestic product in a economy without financial frictions and flexible price
setting for the domestic non-traded and imported good. 5
2.4 Aggregate Private Indebtedness Dynamics
We can see from equation (16) that the credit spread is a function of ag-
gregate debt and, differently from the basic New Keynesian model, we not
longer assume that in the aggregate this equates to zero. Then, it is im-
portant to characterize its dynamics in order to close the model. For this
purpose, we should aggregate equation (5) over B. Then we have:
Ptbt =
∫
B
Bt(i)di = −
∫
B
{At(i) + Rt(i)} di (57)
The fist term is the beginning of period net financial wealth held by bor-
rowers, and the second is their excess of consumption for period t given
by:
Rt(i) =
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)ht(i, j)dj + Dn,t + Dx,t + D f ,t + T
g
t − Ptct(i) (58)
Borrowers Beginning of Period Net Financial Wealth is characterize by
∫
B
At(i)di = δ
{
−Pt−1bt−1(1+ ibt−1) + pibDintt
}
+ (1− δ)pib At (59)
The first term relates the beginning of period financial wealth for those
who did not change type and, hence, did not receive any insurance transfer.
The second term correspond to those who did receive the transfer. Aggre-
gating equation (4) over i we have that:
At = Pt−1(bt−1 + b
g
t−1)(1+ i
d
t−1)− Pt−1bt−1(1+ ibt−1) + Dintt (60)
Using the definition of Dintt from equation (11), and the uncovered inter-
est parity condition from equation (11), and expressing in real terms, we
have
At
Pt
=
(
bgt−1 − b∗t−1qt−1
) (1+ idt )
Πt
(61)
Then, the beginning of period financial wealth is the debt held by the
government less the debt from international financial markets. Aggregating
the second term in equation (57) we have
∫
B
Rt(i)di = pibRbt = pib
{
Wbt + Dn,t + Dx,t + D f ,t + T
g
t − Ptcbt
}
(62)
where Wbt =
∫
B
∫ 1
0 Wt(j)ht(j)djdi is the nominal labor income for borrowers.
For both types, we have that aggregating equation (35) over j and over each
type, real labor income for each one is:
∫
τ
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)
Pt
ht(j)djdi = wτt =
(
µwt ψτ
λτt H¯
ν
t
)(
yn,t
zt
)1+ωy
∆n,t (63)
5 Following Curdia and Woodford (2009) financial frictions are taken out by setting Ξt and χt to
their steady state values.
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where ∆n,t is the domestic traded good price dispersion. Following Curdia
and Woodford (2009) appendix, ∆n,t is expressed as
∆n,t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pn,t(j)
Pn,t
)−θn(1+ωy)
dj
= α∆n,t−1Π
φ(1+ωy)
n,t + (1− α)
(
Kn,t
Fn,t
)−φ(1+ωy)
1+ωyθ
(64)
Aggregating profit equations (36) and (43), using government budget
constraint in equation (54), and expressing in real terms, we get from equa-
tion (62):
pibRbt
Pt
=pib
{
cbt + pis(w
b
t − wst) + gdpt
− P˜n,tgt + bgt − bgt−1
(1+ idt )
Πt
} (65)
where wst is the real labor income that corresponds to savers. Replacing
equations (51), (52), and (53), that characterize aggregate supply, equations
(22), (24), and (25) that determine the optimal allocation for the different
consumption baskets, into equation (54) we can reexpress gdpt as
gdpt = ct + P˜n,t(Ξtb
η
t + gt) + P˜x,tc
∗
x,t − qtP∗f ,ty f ,t (66)
where ct = pibcbt + pisc
s
t . Finally, replacing equation (66) into (65), we get:
pibRbt
Pt
=pibpis
(
(cbt − cst)− (wbt − wst)
)
+ pib
(
bgt − bgt−1
(1+ idt−1)
Πt
+ Tbt + P˜n,tΞtb
η
t
) (67)
Where,
Tbt = P˜x,tc∗x,t − qtP∗f ,ty f ,t (68)
We can further reexpress equation (67) by finding a relation between the
trade balance Tbt, and the dynamics of foreign debt. By defining aggre-
gate saving similar to equation (57) we can express financial intermediaries
resource constraint in equation (13) as:
qtb∗t = b
g
t −
At
Pt
− pib R
b
t
Pt
− pis R
s
t
Pt
+ P˜n,tΞ(bt) + χtbt (69)
Through a similar process to reach equation (67) we have that
pib
Rbt
Pt
+ pis
Rst
Pt
= bgt + Tbt + P˜n,tΞtb
η
t − bt−1
(1− idt−1)
Πt
(70)
Replacing (66) into (65) we have that
qtb∗t = qt−1b∗t−1
(1− idt−1)
Πt
+ χtbt − Tbt (71)
bayesian estimation 14
Replacing equations (59), (61), (67), and (71) into (57) we have that
the dynamics of private indebtedness are characterized by the following
expression
bt(1+ pibωt) =δ
[
bt−1
(1− ibt−1)
Πt
− pib D
int
t
Pt
]
+ pib
[(
qtb∗t − δqt−1b∗t−1
(1+ idt−1)
Πt
)
−
(
bgt − δbgt−1
(1+ idt−1)
Πt
)]
pibpis
[
(cbt − cst)− (wbt − wst)
]
(72)
I can be seen, that aggregate debt depends on the beginning-of period
financial wealth held by borrowers, the change of the aggregate beginning-
of period financial wealth (we can see from equation (61) that the middle
term is proportional to the change of At/Pt from period t− 1 to t ), and the
consumption-labor income difference from borrowers to savers.
3 bayesian estimation
Since the purpose of this article is to determine the existence on any benefits
to the Colombian economy from targeting credit spreads in the Taylor Rule
described in equation (56), we need to set the model’s parameters to reflect
Colombian aggregate variable dynamics. In order to do this we use Bayesian
estimation techniques.
3.1 The Structural Parameters
First, it is useful to list the model’s parameters. This is is a model with 15 ex-
ogenous shock that, as described above, come from the following variables:
C¯bt , C¯
s
t , H¯t, µ
w
t , i
b∗
t , Ξ˜t,χt, zt, P
∗
f ,t, P
∗
x,t, c
∗
t , τn,t, τf ,t, gt, b
g
t .
6 We assume that each
one follows an independent AR(1) process; so this means that we would
have 30 parameters related to the exogenous processes accounting for the
autoregressive and the standard error parameters. Additionally, the model
has 23 structural parameters which are listed below:
Table 1: Structural Parameters
1. σb 2. σs 3. ν 4. ψb 5. ψs
6. ψ 7. δ 8. pib 9. pis 10 . ψ1
11. η 12. γ 13. ρh 14. γn 15 . ρn
16. θn 17. θ f 18. φ 19. α 20 . β
21. φΠ 22. φy 23. φω
Differently from most Real Business Cycle models, the steady state de-
posits interest rate no longer reflect the inverse of β. Now it has to account
6 τx,t was state as an exogenous shock. However, this has no aggregate effect because it acts as
a government lump-sum tax. This can be seen from equations (5) and (50).
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for the both types of interest rates. In this sense, we can solve β from equa-
tions (8) and (9), which would be calibrated to
β =
δ+ 1+ωss(δ+ (1− δ)pib)−
√
(δ+ 1+ωss(δ+ (1− δ)pib))2 − 4δ(1+ωss)
2idssδ(1+ωss)
(73)
As it was stated above, ψb and ψs are calibrated in order to equate worked
hours for both types in steady state. Since wages are the same for both types
of households, we can see from equation (72) and (63) that equating worked
hours is the same as equating real labor income for both types. This implies
that
ψb
ψs
=
λbss
λsss
= Ω (74)
If equation (8) is divided by equation by λsss we have that
Ω =
1− idssβ(δ+ (1− δ)pis)
idssβ(1− δ)pib
(75)
Additionally, we can express ψs from equation (32) as
ψs = ψ[pibΩ
1
ν + pis]
ν (76)
If we set ψ = 1, by replacing (75) and (76) in equation (74) we wil
have the calibration for ψb. Given that the probabilities for the drawn of
the new type must add to one, we set pis = 1− pib. Following Curdia and
Woodford (2010) we assume that the average of the intertemporal elasticities
of substitution for both types must equate the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of a conventional New Keynesian model, this means σ = pibσb +
pisσs; it is also assumed that σb/σs = 5. We set σ = 5 following Hamann et
al (2006). This implies that each parameter is calibrated as follows:
σs =
σ
1+ 4pib
; (77)
σb = 5σs; (78)
Similar to Lopez et al (2009), the risk premium parameter ψ1 is set to
0.000003. The reason is that incorporation of a risk premium is for technical
reasons in order to avoid non stationary dynamics, and is suggested by
Gertler et al (2007) to keep this parameter close to zero so it does not affect
high-frequency dynamics. We set θn = θ f = 6, and ρn = ρh = 1 as Lopez
et al (2009) given these parameters weak identification. For the same reason
we follow Hamann et al (2006) and set φ = 1.6, and η = 5 following Curdia
and Woodford (2010).
The parameter δ is set equal to 0.9; this value is lower than Curdia and
Woodford (2010), but it does not conflict with credit spread steady state set
at 1.0174 at quarterly frequency. We set gdpss = 1 in order to express the
variables a ratios to Gross Domestic Product. It is assumed that purchase
power parity holds in steady state, hence qss = 1. It is assumed that stead
state gross inflation Πss is 1. We set css = 0.65, gss = 0.165, bss = 1.07,
b∗ss = 1.07, and idss = 1.01 to be consistent Colombian aggregate quarterly
frequency data and calibrate other variables steady states to be consistent
with these values. 7 We set the parameter for the credit spread in the
7 For more details see Bejarano and Charry (2014) calibration appendix
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Taylor Rule φω = 0 for two reasons: first, since the establishment of inflation
targeting Colombian Central bank objective focuses by law in stabilizing
inflation and output. Second, assuming the central bank does not react to
credit spreads serves us as a benchmark to study the effects over aggregate
variables of changing the value of φω. Finally, we assume that χss = 0 so the
aggregate default probability does not affect the steady state of the model.
3.2 Priors and Posteriors
So far we have described that calibrations of some parameters in order to
fulfill some assumptions or reflect Colombian economy steady state rela-
tionships. The remaining parameters have to be estimated in order to reflect
Colombian aggregate data dynamics. Using Bayesian estimation techniques
allows us to identify these parameters by making more stable a high non-
linear optimization algorithm such as a likelihood estimation over the pa-
rameters of a DSGE model. The procedure, based on Bayes’ law, involves
updating our beliefs about the distribution of the parameters using the likeli-
hood function of the data that comes from the log-linear state representation
of the model through a Kalman Filter. This updating becomes the posterior
distribution of the parameters. By Bayes’ Law have that:
P
(
θ|YT , A
)
=
P
(
YT |θ, A) P (θ|A)
P (YT |A) (79)
Where A stands for the model, θ stands for the model parameters, and YT
stands for the data sample considered. Here P (θ|A) is the prior distribution
of the structural parameters, P
(
YT |θ, A) is the likelihood function of the
data conditional on the parameters, P
(
θ|YT , A) is the posterior distribution
of the structural parameters given the data and the model, and P
(
YT |A)
is the marginal density of the data conditional on the model. Since this
last expression is a constant for any parameter value, we can express the
posterior Kernel (or un-normalized posterior distribution) as:
P
(
θ|YT , A
)
∝ P
(
YT |θ, A
)
P (θ|A) ≡ K
(
θ|YT , A
)
(80)
Since this expression may not have a known distribution, computational
techniques are required to find the mode and use a sampling algorithm
around the mode to get an empirical distribution. The idea is to use a
sampling algorithm called Metropolis-Hastings algorithm which involves
the following steps:
1. Use a numerical optimization routine to find the posterior mode of the
logarithm of the posterior distribution and compute the inverse of the
Hessian Σ at the mode.
2. Draw a proposal θ∗ from a jumping distribution
J
(
θ∗|θt−1
)
= N
(
θt−1, cΣ
)
(81)
3. Compute the acceptance ratio:
r =
P
(
θ∗|YT , A)
P (θt−1|YT , A) (82)
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4. Accept or discard the proposal θ∗ according to the following rule:
θt =
{
θ∗ with probability min(r, 1),
θt−1 with probability r− 1. (83)
Following this procedure we can obtain a sample of the posterior distri-
bution which can be used to construct the first and second moments of the
structural parameters distribution. Then, the mean of the posterior distribu-
tion would be used as the parameter values in the this model, so optimal
monetary policy analysis can be done in the section below.
The data used for this estimation consists on quarterly data on Gross Do-
mestic Product, consumption, inflation, deposit interest rate, deposits and
credits interest rate spread, debt, and wages for the period 2001:1-2014:2.
The sources of these datasets are Banco de la Republica and Departamento
Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE). The inflation is the percent-
age change on CPI index; the credit spread is the ratio from average gross
interest rate from fixed term deposits (DTF) and the average gross interest
rate on loans; debt are the loans held by the financial institutions; wages
are calculated by DANE for the manufacturing industry. GDP, consump-
tion, and debt are divided by the labor force to express them in per capita
terms. All series are deseasonalized using a X12 arima algorithm, then ex-
pressed in logarithms and detrended using a one-sided HP-filter as Stock
and Watson(1999).
The priors and posterior distributions are described in the table 2. For
all the autoregressive parameters a Beta distribution prior was chosen with
mean 0.5; for all the standard errors a Inverse Gamma distribution was cho-
sen with mean 0.02 and infinite standard deviation. The Calvo parameter α
has a Beta prior with range (0, 1) with mean 0.5; the Taylor Rule coefficients
for inflation and Gross Domestic Product have a Gaussian prior with mean
1.5 and 0.125, respectively, following Hamann et al (2006). The prior for the
inverse Frisch elasticity ν is a Gaussian with mean 0.5, according to Gonza-
lez et a(2013). The share prior of borrowers pib was set as a Beta distribution
with mean 0.5 and range (0, 1) following Cuardia and Woodford (2010). The
parameters controlling for the share of consumption on the domestic goods
and the domestic non-traded good, γ and γn, are set with beta distribution
priors, mean 0.75, and range (0.5, 1). 8 Finally, we set a measurement error
to the wage series following Pfeifer (2014). Its prior distribution is a Inverse
Gamma with mean set to 10% of the original series standard deviation.
The estimated parameters are based on two Metropolis-Hastings samples
of 100,000, burning the first 50,000 on each one. It seems that the data set
is informative over most parameters since the estimated standard deviation
is lower to the one assumed in the priors. Similarly to Lopez et al (2009)
the Calvo parameter mean is estimated around 0.4. The Taylor Rule coeffi-
cients were estimated at 1.45 and 0.4, respectively, which implies a stronger
response to output from what was first assume. ν is estimated to 0.34 which
is in line with Prada and Rojas (2009). The share of borrowers was estimated
at 0.35. This means that to the dataset it is not longer consistent an economy
where half the population has negative financial wealth. Estimated values
for γ and γn are over 0.75. This shows a strong inclination for consumption
of domestic and domestic non-traded good for the Colombian economy. Fi-
nally, most exogenous shocks parameters do not seem to be strong since
the autoregressive parameters are not estimated far over 0.5 and many esti-
mated standard deviations go below the initial 0.02.
8 This range was chosen due that values below 0.5 drive indeterminacy
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Table 2: Priors and Posteriors
Prior Posterior
Parameter Distribution Mean S.D Range Mean S.D 5% 95%
α Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.4288 0.0774 0.3066 0.5487
φΠ Gaussian 1.500 0.100 (∞,∞) 1.4493 0.0880 1.3115 1.5914
φy Gaussian 0.125 0.100 (∞,∞) 0.3994 0.0668 0.2831 0.5123
ν Gaussian 0.500 0.100 (∞,∞) 0.3447 0.0622 0.2390 0.4506
pib Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.3534 0.0506 0.2732 0.4382
γn Beta 0.750 0.100 (0.5, 1) 0.7756 0.0613 0.6756 0.8806
γ Beta 0.750 0.100 (0.5, 1) 0.7829 0.0543 0.7033 0.8643
ρib∗ Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5274 0.0773 0.3848 0.6712
ρχ Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.7600 0.0461 0.6747 0.8431
ρΞ Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5044 0.1066 0.3374 0.6596
ρP∗x Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5710 0.1075 0.4109 0.7287
ρP∗f Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5349 0.1092 0.3701 0.7060
ρc∗x Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5123 0.0716 0.3962 0.6367
ρµw Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5565 0.0920 0.4127 0.7101
ρH¯ Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5182 0.1034 0.3461 0.6778
ρz Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5359 0.0512 0.4453 0.6272
ρC¯b Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.7683 0.0417 0.6988 0.8383
ρC¯s Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5673 0.0591 0.4638 0.6654
ρbg Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5207 0.1063 0.3572 0.6883
ρg Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5145 0.0977 0.3662 0.6607
ρτn Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.4954 0.1060 0.3321 0.6568
ρτf Beta 0.500 0.100 (0, 1) 0.5280 0.1042 0.3731 0.6879
σib∗ Inv.Gamma 0.500 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0049 0.0008 0.0032 0.0063
σχ Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0028 0.0003 0.0024 0.0032
σΞ Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0150 0.0035 0.0047 0.0268
σP∗x Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0096 0.0021 0.0041 0.0150
σP∗f Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0101 0.0026 0.0052 0.0152
σc∗x Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0741 0.0144 0.0475 0.1026
σµw Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0064 0.0009 0.0047 0.0080
σH¯ Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0097 0.0025 0.0048 0.0140
σz Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0129 0.0016 0.0101 0.0154
σC¯b Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0835 0.0119 0.0609 0.1067
σC¯s Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0284 0.0041 0.0216 0.0350
σbg Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0437 0.0074 0.0301 0.0569
σg Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0081 0.0018 0.0048 0.0114
στn Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0130 0.0036 0.0054 0.0217
στf Inv.Gamma 0.020 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0116 0.0029 0.0049 0.0191
σwages Inv.Gamma 0.001 ∞ (0,∞) 0.0008 0.0001 0.0003 0.0015
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4 optimal monetary policy
Given the estimated parameters of the previews section, now we can iden-
tify the optimal response from the central bank to credit spreads movements
and the benefits within. In order to do this, we follow Bejarano and Charry
(2014) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) were a Welfare function approx-
imated up to second order, following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), is
maximized over the parameter φω in the Taylor Rule given by equation (56).
Then, we compute the welfare loss associated on using the reaction to credit
spreads in the benchmark model, φω = 0, instead of the one that maximizes
the welfare function.
4.1 The Aggregate Welfare Function
Considering the model described in 2th section, Optimal Monetary Policy
problem consists in maximizing the following Welfare function over φ∗ω:
φ∗ω =argmax
{
Wt = pibu(cbt ; C¯t
b
) + pisu(cst ; C¯t
s
)
− φ
1+ ν
(
yn,t
zt
)1+ωy ( Λ˜t
λ˜t
) 1+ν
ν ∆t
H¯t
ν + βEtWt+1

(84)
Where
Λ˜t
1+ν
ν = ψ
1
ν
(
pibψ
− 1ν
b λ
b
t
1+ν
ν + pisψ
− 1ν
s λ
s
t
1+ν
ν
)
(85)
The welfare function comes from aggregating equation (1) over i. Since
we are maximizing the welfare equation approximated to second order, it is
not possible to find a reduced form solution. However, it is possible to set a
discrete grid for φω and evaluate equation (84) in each grid point, choosing
the grid point that gives the highest value. For this exercise we choose grid
points with length of 0.05.
Additionally, we need to compute welfare loss associated with using an
different reaction to credit spreads in the Taylor rule instead of φ∗ω. To do
this, let W∗t be the welfare level implied by φ∗ω and Wat the welfare implied by
any other alternative φaω 6= φ∗ω. Welfare loss is measured as the percentage
of consumption, Γφ∗aω , sacrificed by consumers associated to φ
∗
ω in order to
obtain Wat . This implies that
W∗t [cb∗t , cs∗t ] ≥W∗at [(1− Γφ∗aω )cb∗t , (1− Γφ∗aω )cs∗t ] = Wat (86)
Once the welfare values W∗t and Wat are computed, Γφ∗aω can be solved
from equation (86).
4.2 The Optimal Response to Credit Spread and Welfare Loss
We compute the optimal response to credit spreads φ∗ω taking into account
all the exogenous shocks in order to reflect all possible disturbances Colom-
bian economy can face according to our model. We can see from table 3
that for this case φ∗ω = −0.6. This can be interpreted as the average optimal
response to all financial and non financial disturbances. This result was not
computed by Curdia and Woodford (2010) or Bejarano and Charry (2014).
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Table 3: Optimal Response and Welfare Loss on Individual Shocks
Shock φ∗ω 100xΓφω=0.6 100xΓφω=0 S.Dω
ALL -0.60 0% 28.787e-3% 4.2938e-3
χt -2.15 61.581e-3% 102.07e-3% 3.6955e-3
C¯bt 0.40 44.202e-3% 6.0920e-3% 1.5930e-3
bgt -4.15 8.2472e-3% 9.5010e-3% 996.22e-6
zt -1.20 3.4382e-3% 12.326e-3% 716.29e-6
C¯st -0.80 263.97e-6% 3.9026e-3% 659.36e-6
ib∗t -1.95 6.3032e-3% 12.070e-3% 635.29e-6
P∗x,t 6.50 7.4369e-3% 6.3444e-3% 325.95e-6
τf ,t -0.15 107.29e-6% 9.7918e-6% 307.69e-6
c∗t -2.40 10.052e-3% 17.438e-3% 285.38e-6
Ξ˜t -4.80 698.54e-6% 776.15e-6% 256.20e-6
P∗f ,t 5.20 960.42e-6% 779.10e-6% 207.22e-6
gt -1.30 158.77e-6% 505.62e-6% 137.30e-6
H¯t -1.10 51.903e-6% 240.42e-6% 112.81e-6
µwt -1.25 24.380e-6% 82.161e-6% 56.939e-6
However, this result is important as it reflects a general recommendation
for monetary policy that can be tractable and easy to understand; the same
way that it is usually recommended that φΠ > 1 in order to assure inflation
stability. For this recommendation to be implementable, we could expect, at
least, that the welfare gains associated to this recommendation are higher
than those implied by φω = 0 for each shock.
Table 3 shows the optimal response to credit spreads to each individual
shock, as the welfare loss with respect to the recommended reaction φω =
−0.6 and benchmark reaction φω = 0. Almost all optimal reaction to credit
spreads are negative, except for international prices for imports and exports,
and borrowers preference shock. It is immediately clear that for shocks that
imply φ∗ω ≥ 0, the economy is better off with the benchmark reaction φω = 0,
than with the recommended reaction φω = −0.6, since Γφω=0.6 ≥ Γφω=0 .
If, for example, we assume a shock to borrowers preferences, C¯bt , we can
see from the impulse response in figure 1 that borrowers are inclined to take
more loans from financial intermediaries and, hence, face a higher credit
spread. The optimal response for this shock would imply a positive reaction
to the increase of the credit spread in order to rise borrowers interest rate ibt ,
so that output and inflation do not fall far from target values. However, the
recommended reaction φω = −0.6 would lower borrowers interest rate and
increase the deviation of output and inflation from target values, implying
a higher deposits interest rate to control these, after all. Finally, we can
see that the benchmark reaction φω = 0 falls somewhere in the middle;
justifying less welfare loss in this scenario.
We can see, also, from table 3, that the welfare loss from implementing
φω = 0, instead of the recommended value is 0.028%. This means that
households would sacrifice this consumption percentage in order to obtain
the same level of welfare as the benchmark scenario. In order to see how
this welfare loss is reflected in aggregate variable dynamics, we conduct a
counterfactual analysis, where several historic data series are compared to
simulated data where monetary policy is conducted following the recom-
mended φ∗ω = −0.6.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response to shock C¯t
b using estimated parameters ρ
C¯t
b
and σ
C¯t
b . Result expressed as percentage points deviations from
steady state.
Figure 2 shows us that implementing the recommended reaction to credit
spreads does not imply significant changes to aggregate variables dynamics.
The only simulated variables that show a different dynamic to its historic
counterpart are the deposit interest rate and inflation (although it is less pro-
nounced).The deposit interest rate shows a positive comovement with the
credit spread, which at first glance might seem counterintuitive. As Curdia
and Woodford (2010) explains, although the recommended reaction implies
a negative reaction to credit spread, it does not mean that the interest rate
will actually fall to increases of the credit spread. Near 2010 credit spreads
fell around 0.03% below trend, the recommended reaction would imply a
rise in the deposit interest rate to discourage a rise of loans; however, this
would result in less pressure on price and a lower inflation, which would
imply a drop of the deposit interest rate.
So far we have learned that a general recommendation does not imply
considerable welfare gains to all shocks compared to the benchmark reaction
φω = 0; as is the case for a borrowers preferences shock. Additionally, the
fact that the implementation of the recommended reaction to credit spreads
does not translate into considerable changes in macroeconomics variables
might explain why welfare loss is not that significant between φω = −0.6
and φω = 0. These are an important result as they imply a weak benefit
from implementing a general response to credit spreads. It is possible that
considerable benefits exist not to a global reaction to all shocks, but to an
individual shock once the source of the disturbance is identified.
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Figure 2: Counterfactual analysis between historic data and simulated data
assuming φω = −0.6. Result expressed as percentage points devi-
ations from trend.
We see from table 3, that must of the optimal reactions are strong com-
pared to the recommended φ∗ω = −0.6; only the optimal reaction to credit
spreads for both types preference shocks and imports taxes shocks are in
the (−1, 1) range. However, these differences in the strength of the reaction
to the credit spread do not translate to significant welfare loss from setting
φω = 0. The biggest welfare loss occurs to the aggregate default probability
shock, χt. In this case, household would sacrifice 0.102% of their consump-
tion if φω = 0 was set instead of φ∗ω = −2.15. A similar logic follows to
φω = −0.6, the biggest welfare loss is associated to the aggregate default
probability χt, being 0.061%. This means that households would sacrifice
less that 0.1% of their consumption from a reaction to spreads of φω = −0.6,
instead of φ∗ω = −2.15, when an aggregate default probability shock occurs.
The reason why most optimal responses to individual shocks are outside
the (−1, 1) range can be found in Curdia and Woodford(2010). They found
that the strength of the response tends to be grater the lower the persistence
of the credit spread is. Curdia and Woodford(2010) found an optimal re-
sponse of φ∗ω = −0.66 for the aggregate default probability shock, χt, with
an autoregressive parameter ρχ = 0.9 and standard error σχ = 0.04, while
our estimated parameters for this shock were 0.76 and 0.0028, respectively.
If we calibrate the same shock to our model, the optimal response implied
would be of -1.15, which is almost half the response to the estimated shock.
However, if we keep the persistence the same and only change the standard
error the optimal response would be the same.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response to shock χt comparing estimated parameters
and Curdia and Woodford’s (2010) σχ. Result expressed as per-
centage points deviations from steady state.
Table 3 also provides an interesting fact about this model, the fifth col-
umn shows the standard deviation of the credit spread if φω = 0 was as-
sumed. There is a positive relation between the standard deviation and the
welfare loss compared to both, φω = −0.6 and φω = 0. These standard
deviations are not far from the standard deviation of credit spreads implied
from historic data on figure 2, which is 1.1384e-3. The sample period se-
lected for the estimation was chosen to reflect a monetary policy compatible
with the Taylor rule, since for the new millennium Target inflation criteria
was adopted, but is not known to have a financial crisis. For times without
financial turmoil credit spreads do not tend to be volatile, but periods for
with financial stress this spread rises significantly. Chari et al (2008) show
evidence of this fact for US economy during the 2008 financial crisis. They
analyzed several measures of credit spreads and showed that these were a
stable measure until Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. Specially for the Tbill
and Libor rate spread; this measure was a steady measure of 0.5%, but the
following month after Lehman Brother collapsed it increased up to 4.5%.
Figure 3 compares the impulse response to a shock to , χt, changing its
standard deviation from 0.0028 to 0.4 as Curdia and Woodford (2010), but
keeping the autoregressive parameter fixed at 0.76. It is clear that credit
spreads reacts significantly more in the latter case; as well as the other vari-
ables. This figure also compares the optimal reaction to credit spreads to the
benchmark. If monetary authority reacted optimally at φ∗ω = −2.15 output
would rise instead of falling, it would imply a higher inflation, deposit in-
terest rate and debt. It seems that, at least for the standard deviation of this
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Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis between historic data and simulated data
assuming σχ = 0.4 in 2008:II. Result expressed as percentage
points deviations from trend.
shock, the optimal reaction would imply a significant change to macroeco-
nomic variables. Additionally,it also implies an increase in welfare loss. This
scenario would imply welfare loss of Γφω=0 = 11.9% and Γφω=0.6 = 7.38%,
which are 1,166 and 1,209 times bigger, respectively, compared to the esti-
mated standard deviation.
Finally, historic data is compared to simulated data assuming that in
September 2008 the aggregate default probability standard deviation in-
creased to 0.04, as was set on figure 3. Is an example were is simulated
a scenario where the 2008 financial crisis were transmitted to the Colom-
bian economy. The results are shown in figure 4. This figure also compares
the general recommendation φω = −0.6 to φω = 0. As in figure 3, now the
increase of credit spreads has a significant impact over the economy with
respect to historic data. The implementation of an optimal response would
avoid output from falling beyond 10% below trend, with a less significant
effect over inflation. Additionally, It would not affect significantly debt dy-
namics. This figure also shows that the fall of the deposit interest rate would
be similar to both reactions, but if φω = 0 was assumed, it would rise earlier.
The overall conclusion from these last two figures is that a reaction is recom-
mended whenever credit spreads increase its volatility, as it would indicate
a financial disruption.
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5 conclusions
After estimating Bejarano and Charry (2014) model’s structural parameters
the optimal response to credit spreads to all disturbances were computed.
First, it was analyzed if a general reaction to all disturbances interacting si-
multaneously could improve monetary policy with respect to a non respon-
sive scenario. Unfortunately, for some disturbances the Colombian economy
is better off if the central bank does not react at all. Additionally, this gen-
eral response does not imply significant welfare gains, since the impact over
macroeconomic variables is null.
Then, each shock was analyzed individually. Similar to Curdia and Wood-
ford (2010) the optimal response depended on the source of the disturbance
and on its persistence. Although many of these optimal reactions were out-
side the (−1, 1) range, similarly to the general recommendation, they did
not imply significant welfare gains or responses from output and inflation.
The main explanation to the lack of responsiveness is that the credit
spread is not volatile for the sample considered for the estimation. The
sample from 2001:I-2014:II is not associated to a financial crisis period, al-
though it serves as a good approximation of monetary policy conducted by
a Taylor rule, since Inflation targeting was implemented after 2000. How-
ever, a counterfactual analysis, that compared the historic data to a simu-
lated data where the 2008 financial crisis spreads to the Colombian economy,
showed that after a increase in credit spreads volatility the Colombian econ-
omy could obtain considerable gains and stabilized output from reacting to
this variable.
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